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Everettian Quantum Mechanics 
 
Alastair Wilson 
University College, Oxford 
 
Abstract 
Simon Saunders and David Wallace have proposed an appealing 
candidate semantics for interpreting linguistic communities embedded in 
an Everettian multiverse. It provides a charitable interpretation of our 
ordinary talk about the future, and allows us to retain a principle of 
bivalence for propositions and to retain the Law of Excluded Middle in 
the logic of propositions about the future. But difficulties arise when it 
comes to providing an appropriate account of the metaphysics of 
macroscopic objects and events. In this paper, I evaluate various 
metaphysical frameworks which might be combined with the Saunders-
Wallace semantics. I conclude that the most appropriate metaphysics to 
underwrite the semantics renders Everettian quantum mechanics a 
theory of non-overlapping worlds. 
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1. Introduction 
 Simon Saunders and David Wallace [2008] have proposed a distinctive 
candidate semantics (for short: the SW semantics) for interpreting linguistic 
communities that are embedded in an Everettian multiverse1. On their view, 
further elucidated in Saunders [2010], all material objects and events, including 
linguistic tokens, are branch-bound - that is, each one is uniquely related to 
some particular complete branch of the quantum state. This account is 
semantically conservative, in that it allows for utterances to be true or false 
simpliciter, with no need for relativization of truth-value. Previous treatments of 
the semantics of talk about the future in Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) 
have involved single utterances with complex semantic properties2; the SW 
semantics instead involves multiple utterances, each with simple semantic 
properties.  
 
 Saunders and Wallace [2008] do not give a complete formal breakdown 
of the SW semantics, but the following principles should give a general idea of 
how it works. In this reconstruction I’ve used a roughly Kaplanian framework. 
 
T: The primary bearers of truth-values – propositions – are 
sentences at contexts. 
U: Utterances express propositions; each utterance corresponds 
to a pairing of some concrete vocalization with some particular 
context. 
C: Contexts are centred complete branches of the quantum 
state. 
 
T, U and C in combination entail that where there are multiple complete 
branches, there are multiple contexts and hence multiple distinct utterances. To 
reconcile such multiplicity with a charitable interpretation of ordinary thought 
and talk, we require that the quantifiers in utterances are restricted: 
 
R: Referring terms in utterances normally range over a domain 
containing only entities in the complete branch of the utterance’s 
context.  
 
 Assume for simplicity that an agent has complete knowledge of the 
global properties of the quantum state; any remaining ignorance that the agent 
                                            
1 In this paper, I will presuppose along with Saunders and Wallace that a 
decoherence-based solution to the ‘preferred basis problem’ is successful, and that it 
provides an Everettian with the resources to solve the quantum measurement 
problem. For defence of this claim, see Saunders [1993, 1995]. 
2 See, for example, Wallace [2003] and Tappenden [2008]. 
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might have is cashed out according to the SW semantics as self-locating 
ignorance, ignorance about the agent’s precise location within the quantum state. 
Much of our ordinary ignorance of contingent3 fact can then be thought of as 
self-locating: for example, our ignorance about whether a sphere of gold a mile in 
diameter exists becomes ignorance about whether or not we belong to a mile-
diametered-gold-sphere-containing branch. Similarly, an utterance of ‘I exist’ 
typically refers to exactly one person, located in the branch of the utterance’s 
context. However, due to my incomplete knowledge of the properties of the 
complete centred branch in which I am located, I will typically be ignorant of 
many of the properties of the person to whom I refer using the term ‘I’. 
 
 The purpose of this semantic framework is to recover a robust notion of 
self-locating ignorance, prior to a quantum interaction, which can underwrite an 
agent’s assignment of objective probabilities to specific interaction outcomes even 
if that agent knows that quantum mechanics is true and that the quantum state 
evolves globally in accordance with the Schrödinger equation. This self-locating 
ignorance can then help provide a solution to the ‘incoherence problem’ (in the 
terminology of Wallace [2003]) of explaining how EQM makes room for non-
trivial probabilities. In turn, a solution to the incoherence problem opens the 
way for a solution to the ‘quantitative problem’, of explaining why these 
probabilities should match those given by the Born Rule4. 
 
 I think that the SW semantic proposal is promising: it allows for a 
charitable interpretation of our ordinary talk about the future on the supposition 
that we are living in an Everettian multiverse, and it allows the Everettian to 
retain a general principle of bivalence for propositions, and to retain the Law of 
Excluded Middle in the logic of propositions about the future. But difficulties 
arise with providing an appropriate account of the metaphysics of macroscopic 
objects and events which can underwrite the SW semantics. In this paper, I will 
evaluate various metaphysical pictures we might seek to combine with it. 
 
 The plan is as follows. In section 2, I discuss a view which I call ‘Literal 
Fission’. Although it looks at first like a natural way for an Everettian to 
interpret the quantum formalism, I argue that Literal Fission in combination 
with the SW semantics cannot ground all the uncertainty-claims needed for a 
non-revisionary account of objective probability. Section 3 considers an 
                                            
3 It is commonly presumed that the laws of quantum mechanics, and the initial 
conditions of the universe, are contingent; uncertainty of these facts is not self-
locating uncertainty according to the present proposal. Might this provide an 
Everettian with reason to think that such facts might after all be non-contingent?  
4 The Born Rule is the recipe for assigning probabilities to distinct quantum-
mechanical outcomes. Much progress has been made on a decision-theoretic solution 
to the quantitative problem in recent years; see in particular Wallace [2010]. 
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alternative view, ‘Macroscopic Pairing’, which has been proposed by Saunders 
and Wallace [2008] and by Saunders [forthcoming]. I raise some concerns about 
this picture, on the grounds that it requires a revisionary mereology and 
property-structure for macroscopic objects. In section 4 I outline a third account 
of macroscopic ontology for Everettians, which I call ‘Space-time Point Pairing’. 
I argue that Space-time Point Pairing can underwrite the application of the SW 
semantics while preserving an orthodox mereology and property structure for 
macroscopic objects and events, and recommend it to the Everettian who takes 
EQM to be a branching theory. Section 5 is a discussion of some general 
objections which arise for both pairing proposals; section 6 takes a step back and 
examines the overall framework in which they are situated. The view which I 
eventually recommend to the Everettian in section 7 rejects branching of 
Everettian worlds in favour of divergence, and has a structural resemblance to 
Lewisian Modal Realism5. 
2. Literal Fission 
 One picture that has often been associated with EQM identifies 
persisting macroscopic objects and events (‘continuants’) with non-branching 
parts of a branching structure of consistent histories6. Call the parts in question 
‘branch segments’, and call complete big-bang-to-end-of-time consistent histories 
‘branches’. Each continuant then has branch segments in common with 
continuants in some other branches, and (on the assumption that each branch 
contains the big bang as an initial segment) each branch has branch segments in 
common with each other branch. I will refer to this part-sharing metaphysical 
picture as Literal Fission. (‘Macroscopic’, in this context, should not be read 
simply as ‘large’. Macroscopic objects and events will be taken to be those for 
which quantum entanglement is negligible, and which can be described 
classically to a good approximation. ) 
 
 Why think that Saunders and Wallace mean to endorse Literal Fission? 
Because it appears to be forced on us if we take literally their apparently 
unrestricted use of the term ‘temporal part’ and interpret this term (naturally 
enough) as referring to branch segments. For example, in discussion of how their 
proposal might account for de re modal claims, Saunders and Wallace consider 
the following suggestion: 
 
‘C might have had P’ is true if and only if C has a temporal part that 
is a temporal part of a continuant C’ that has P... Thus Al Gore 
                                            
5 See Lewis [1986]. 
6 For an introduction to the consistent histories formalism for quantum mechanics, 
see Griffiths [2001].  
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might have won the 2000 US presidential election, if he has a temporal 
part which is a part of a person who won. 
Saunders and Wallace [2008], p.298 
 
This use of temporal-part language suggests that branch 
segments which are shared between continuants in different 
branches will themselves be continuants located in both 
branches. It is hard to resist identifying such shared 
continuants with persons and things, contrary to the SW 
semantics. See Figure 1 for an illustration of this: continuants 
A and B share branch segments up to branching, and one of 
their shared branch segments, C, is located both in A’s 
branch and in B’s branch. Note that this proposal differs 
significantly from standard counterpart theory for de re 
identities: for example, it does not allow for de re identities 
between individuals with no exactly similar temporal parts. I mention it not to 
defend it, but to highlight the use it makes of temporal-part language. (It should 
also be noted that Saunders and Wallace [2008] only tacitly endorsed this 
proposal, and that neither wish to defend it.) 
 
 In their discussion, Saunders and Wallace focus on utterances such as ‘I 
will see spin-up’, uttered when an agent is about to perform a quantum 
measurement with two possible outcomes: spin-up and spin-down. Here the 
combination of the SW semantics with the Literal Fission metaphysics gives 
unproblematic results. There are two continuant agents, one per branch, which 
share a common part before the measurement; there are two utterances, each 
attributed to one particular agent. One utterance is true, and one false, because 
one agent does in fact see spin-up, while the other in fact sees spin-down. At the 
time of the utterance, each agent is uncertain about which agent he is, and 
correspondingly uncertain about which utterance he has made – the true one or 
the false one. He is therefore uncertain of the truth-value of his utterance. 
 
 So far, so good. I will assume that no significant problems are generated 
by the extension of this approach to an agent’s uncertainty about propositions 
such as ‘the apparatus will read spin-up’, which goes via the idea that an agent’s 
quantifiers are restricted to range over that agent’s branchmates. So where there 
are two agents, there are also two sets of apparatus, one of which will read spin-
up and the other of which will read spin-down. An agent can be uncertain about 
which apparatus he is referring to, because he is uncertain about which one is a 
branch-mate of his. All of this is compatible with the Literal Fission 
metaphysics. 
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 The problem I want to focus on is that Literal Fission does not 
generalize to give us an account of an agent’s uncertainty about events occurring 
futurewards of that agent’s death. Consider, for example, the claim ‘at least one 
sea-battle will occur after my death’ (call this claim SB)7. I take it that after my 
death, various chance events will occur which affect the objective probability of 
sea-battles occurring. Perhaps a year after my death crucial peace talks will 
occur between some feuding island nations. Hence, I take it that we ought to be 
able to recover uncertainty about SB at some time t prior to death, and to 
assign SB non-trivial objective chance at t. 
 
 However, uncertainty about SB cannot be 
accounted for by Literal Fission. For I, as a 
complete continuant, will appear both in branches 
containing sea-battles futurewards of my death, 
and in branches containing no sea-battles 
futurewards of my death. Both sea-battle 
branches and non-sea-battle branches contain the 
aggregate of branch segments which makes up my 
continuant. See Figure 2 for an illustration of 
this. I am wholly located in both branches, so 
how can I be uncertain about which branch is 
mine? Something has to give. 
 
 One potential way out would be to use the SW semantics to account for 
propositions about future events occurring before my death, and a different 
semantics to account for propositions about events occurring futurewards of my 
death. But this is an unattractive move: if there is an unproblematic semantics 
available for propositions about events futurewards of an agent’s death, why not 
apply it more generally and avoid any dualism? The difference between these 
types of proposition doesn’t seem to be linguistically marked; it would be better 
to have a single account to cover all cases. 
 
 Another option for the defender of Literal Fission might be to adopt an 
error theory of our claims about post-death uncertainty. Perhaps it simply does 
not make sense to talk about uncertainty about events occurring after our 
deaths, or probabilities for such events, and we have been mistaken to think that 
it does. According to this view, it is just impossible for me to wonder about what 
will happen after my own death, since there is no unique future for me to 
wonder about. I can still coherently wonder about whether certain events are 
open possibilities at the moment of my death; but I cannot coherently wonder 
about whether they will occur. 
                                            
7 I’m neglecting complications due to special relativity - but we could easily use 
instead the claim that a sea-battle occurs in the forwards light-cone of my death. 
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 Although at first glance this response seems to concede far too much, I 
do not think it can be dismissed as easily as the dualistic semantic proposal just 
discussed. In particular, it is hard to see what would count as empirical evidence 
against the error theory. All of our empirical evidence for quantum mechanics 
consists of past observed frequencies, and objective probabilities for past 
observed frequencies can be made sense of even on the Literal Fission picture. 
While it would require some revisionary metaphysics and involve potential 
conflicts with interpretative charity, I do think that the combination of the SW 
semantics with Literal Fission remains a live option for those who are prepared 
to give up on objective chances about events futurewards of their own deaths. 
However, I will say no more about this possibility. 
 
 A referee asks whether the Literal Fission account suffers from the 
‘Assertion problem’ of Belnap et al [2001]; the problem within a branching-time 
theory of stating the truth-conditions (or correctness-conditions) for an utterance 
of (say) ‘there will be a sea-battle tomorrow’. In the preferred framework of 
Belnap et al. this problem looks serious, as they take each individual utterance 
to be part of many branches. However, in the context of the SW semantics, the 
problem does not arise except in the case of post-death future contingents. If we 
restrict our attention to pre-death future contingents, we can say that it is 
correct to utter ‘there will be a sea-battle tomorrow’ only for agents in contexts 
(complete branches) which contain a sea-battle the following day. Pre-fission, 
there are multiple utterances: some correct, and some incorrect, depending on 
whether or not they are uttered by agents in sea-battle branches. As long as 
each agent and each utterance is a part of one complete branch only, the 
assertion problem does not arise. Of course, as I have just argued, once post-
death future contingents are considered, the combination of Literal Fission and 
the SW semantics breaks down. This objection could perhaps be viewed as a 
special case of the assertion problem; but that terminology is not particularly 
germane, since the problem is not restricted to assertion in particular, but affects 
all cognitive attitudes one might have to post-death future contingents. 
 
 Note that even the application to pre-death future contingents of the 
SW semantics in combination with Literal Fission presupposed that the primary 
bearers of ordinary mental states are continuant persons, rather than the person-
stages to which mental states are ascribed in many popular approaches to 
persistence. If the primary bearers of mental states are person-stages, then all 
future contingents would cause problems for Literal Fission, not just post-death 
future contingents: a person-stage could not worry about its unique future, since 
it would be a part of many distinct continuant persons. To give the account any 
chance at all of success in combination with Literal Fission, we must take the 
bearers of mental states to be continuant persons; this move is made explicitly 
by Saunders and Wallace [2008]. The question of the primary bearers of mental 
states is a delicate one; and the requirement that they be continuants rather 
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than stages is controversial. Fortunately, we will be able to relax it once we 
move beyond Literal Fission to more sophisticated accounts. 
 
 If ascribing mental states to continuant persons rather than to stages is 
an allowable move, might we not go the whole hog and instead take the primary 
bearers of mental states to be complete branches? On this picture, branches will 
typically be ascribed a variety of mental states, sets of which are strongly 
disconnected from one another; for example, our own branch would be ascribed 
both a network of ‘authorish’ mental states and a network of ‘readerish’ mental 
states. This radical suggestion would solve the problem of post-death branching; 
what I generally take to be uncertainty about whether a sea-battle would occur 
after my death would be reconceptualised as my branch being uncertain-
authorishly about whether it includes a sea-battle after some particular time. I 
hope, though, that the reasons for wanting to avoid a view of this sort are clear. 
It is not too much of an intuitive stretch to claim that the primary bearers of 
mental states are continuant humans rather than slices of humans; it is prima 
facie much more implausible to claim that the primary bearers of mental states 
are entire universes. In any case, to adopt this view would be to significantly 
modify the SW semantics, and I will not consider it any further. 
 
 Saunders and Wallace did not intend to combine the SW semantics with 
the Literal Fission picture. As we have seen, it leads to serious problems for the 
application of their semantics to future contingents. The Literal Fission picture 
identifies macroscopic objects and events with non-branching aggregates of 
branch segments; but this fails to ensure that macroscopic objects and entities 
have unique futures. To underwrite the SW semantics, a metaphysical picture is 
required according to which macroscopic continuants are uniquely bound to 
complete branches. And it cannot be simply stipulated that macroscopic objects 
and events are branch-bound; saying does not make it so. We need some account 
of the constitution of macroscopic entities from which it follows that they are 
branch-bound. The next section considers Saunders’ and Wallace’s preferred way 
of underwriting the required link between macroscopic entities and branches. 
3. Macroscopic Pairing 
 What metaphysical alternative to Literal Fission could meet the 
requirement that objects and events be branch-bound?  Whatever the picture is, 
it must involve some relation in which each object or event stands to exactly one 
complete branch, or the problem discussed above with Literal Fission will recur. 
Call this requirement the Branch Binding Criterion. 
 
 The proposal made by Saunders and Wallace [2008] is to identify 
material objects and events not with continuants, but with ordered pairs of the 
following form: ¡maximal continuant, continuant¿. I will call this proposal 
Macroscopic Pairing, since its characteristic feature is to identify macroscopic 
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entities with pairs. It is expressed in rather compressed form in the following 
passage: 
 
As goes the incoherence problem of EQM, it is now rather clear, from 
section 2, of what we are ignorant: we don’t know which world - which 
branch, big-bang to end-of-time - is ours. It is lack of knowledge de se, 
uncertainty of where we are located, not as a stage S but as a world-
stage <W,S> or world-time <W,t>, among the branching worlds. 
Saunders and Wallace [2008], p.301 
 
The proposal is, then, that macroscopic objects and events are to be 
identified with ordered pairs <branch p, continuant q>, where continuant q is a 
part of branch p in the sense employed by the Literal Fission proposal. I will use 
the term ‘branch-continuant’ for such pairs. This proposal has the consequence 
that you are identified with a pair: specifically, <your branch, your continuant>. 
Other objects and events in your branch are identified with branch-continuants 
such as <your branch, continuant r>. 
 
 Worlds, which are naturally thought of as maximal material objects or 
as maximal events, are identified with branch-continuants ¡branch, branch¿. 
Despite using the term ‘world’ in this way for convenience, I aim to remain 
neutral here on the way in which the entities in question relate to the possible 
worlds of modal metaphysics. Although I think the identification of Everett 
worlds with possible worlds is in fact a promising approach to modality, that’s 
an issue for another day. 
 
 Macroscopic Pairing straightforwardly meets the Branch Binding 
Criterion. The relation between each branch-continuant and some branch is just 
inclusion – each branch-continuant includes only one branch. Two branch-
continuants will be parts of the same world if they include the same branch. And 
a branch-continuant x belongs to a world w if and only if x has a first element 
identical to each element of w. Note that we can now, if we like, drop the 
assumption (required for the combination of the SW semantics with Literal 
Fission to get off the ground) that the primary bearers of mental states are 
complete continuant persons rather than person-stages. Branch-continuants, of 
whatever length, are always branch-bound and could coherently be ascribed 
thoughts about their own, unique, branch. 
 
 At first glance, the proposal is likely to strike the reader as pretty 
counter-intuitive. In section 5 I will discuss some objections which question the 
motivation for the view. Before doing so, however, I want to discuss two issues 
of detail, which I think provide us with some motivation to modify Macroscopic 
Pairing. 
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 Consider first the following question: what are the parts of a branch-
continuant such as <my branch, aggregate of my branch segments>? Every 
answer to this question turns out to involve a serious cost. 
 
 One approach to mereology for pairs has it that pairs have no proper 
parts: they are mereological simples. This is not a happy position for a 
proponent of Macroscopic Pairing to take. Once objects and events are identified 
with pairs, the result would be that material objects and events have no proper 
parts at all. This is obviously in serious conflict with our ordinary mereological 
judgments, according to which my foot is a proper part of my body, and a battle 
is a proper part of a war. 
 
 An alternative approach, associated with David Lewis in Parts of 
Classes (Lewis [1991]), has it that pairs (thought of as sets) have all and only 
their subsets as proper parts. But this view is no more favourable to Macroscopic 
Pairing. My only proper parts, on this combination of views, would be the 
singleton set of the branch that I am on, and the singleton set of my aggregate 
of branch segments. Neither of these singletons are themselves macroscopic 
objects, on the Macroscopic Pairing proposal. So once again, macroscopic objects 
and events have no proper parts that are themselves macroscopic objects or 
events – my foot is not a part of me, and the battle is not a part of the war. 
Again, this does serious violence to ordinary thought about parthood. 
 
 To interpret ordinary thought and talk about parthood more charitably, 
we’d have to adopt a highly unorthodox mereology for branch-continuants. If I 
am identical with the pair <branch B, aggregate A>, then my foot will be 
identical to a pair containing B and an aggregate which is a proper part of 
aggregate A. This proposal thus requires a mereology whereby pairs like ¡a,b¿ 
have as parts not <a> or <b> but pairs like <a,c>, where c is a part of b. Of 
course, such a mereology would give bizarre results if applied to pairs other than 
branch-continuants. The pair <Bill, Ben> would have as parts only pairs like 
<Bill, Ben’s arm> and <Bill, Ben’s leg>, without having as parts pairs like <Bill’s 
arm, Ben> or <Bill’s leg, Ben>. This kind of violation of mereological symmetry 
seems extremely problematic. In addition, none of the following would be part of 
<Bill, Ben>: Bill, Ben, Bill’s singleton, Ben’s singleton. By itself, this consequence 
may seem pretty counterintuitive. 
 
 To avoid absurd results of this sort, we would need to restrict the 
modified mereology to apply only to branch-continuants, and say that when 
talking about parts of branch-continuants, we are not strictly speaking applying 
the parthood relation. Rather, we are applying some other relation – parthood* 
– which satisfies the principles outlined in the previous paragraph. But this is an 
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unwelcome conclusion. When we use the word ‘part’ in ordinary language, it 
seems that we are applying the relation of parthood itself, not some other 
relation defined in terms of parthood. Parthood is frequently taken to be a 
universal relation, applying in exactly the same sense to very different domains – 
to sets, to material objects, to events, to works of art, and so on. The 
universality is sometimes accounted for by saying that mereology is ‘quasi-
logical’; sometimes by saying that parthood is a highly natural relation; and 
sometimes by saying that ascriptions of parthood are not context-dependent. I 
think something of this sort is probably correct; but Macroscopic Pairing sits 
uncomfortably with this line of thought. 
 
 Macroscopic Pairing will also lead to complications involving the 
structure of properties had by macroscopic objects and events. Most of the 
ordinary everyday properties that we attribute to macroscopic objects will 
depend only on the second element of a branch-continuant pair. This introduces 
a need for an additional layer of properties which are possessed by branch-
continuants in virtue of certain other properties possessed by the elements of the 
branch-continuants. Such an additional layer of properties comprises an ugly 
complication in our account of qualitative variation amongst material objects 
and events. 
 
 An example helps to illustrate this. Consider the lifespan of some 
particular mouse. The property of lifespan had by the branch-continuant mouse 
is had in virtue of some other property (call it lifespan*) which is possessed by 
the second element of the pair, the mousy continuant. Similarly for properties 
had by branch-continuants at times – a branch-continuant has a mass at a time 
in virtue of its second element having mass* at a time. Thus Macroscopic 
Pairing requires a significant extra commitment to properties: where we might 
have thought there was a single property, Macroscopic Pairing requires us to 
admit two properties, one of which is had by a pair in virtue of the other being 
had by the second element of the pair. I will call properties such as mass* and 
lifespan* ‘dogleg properties’8. The properties typically ascribed to material 
objects in our ordinary discourse, according to Macroscopic Pairing, are dogleg 
properties. 
 
 Like the consequences of Macroscopic Pairing for mereology, its 
consequences for macroscopic property-ascription involve added ideological 
                                            
8 Thanks to an anonymous referee for this terminology. It is worth noting that 
certain other metaphysical views also require such additional layers of properties. For 
example, a Lewis-style four-dimensionalism identifies people with space-time worms 
while taking person-stages to be the fundamental property-bearers; so for Lewis, 
persons have properties like lifespan in virtue of properties had only by their stages. 
See the postscript to Lewis [1976]. 
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complexity and are prima facie costs of the view. This need for modifications of 
the structure of macroscopic properties and of macroscopic mereology may not 
force us to give up Macroscopic Pairing. But I do think that they give us reason 
to examine other frameworks for implementing the SW semantics. In the next 
section, I outline one promising alternative. 
4. Space-time Point Pairing 
 The non-standard mereology and property structure required for 
macroscopic objects and events are prima facie costs of the Macroscopic Pairing 
proposal. But there is an alternative account available which avoids these 
complications. It also goes some way towards reducing the intuitive weirdness of 
Macroscopic Pairing. Instead of identifying all material objects and events with 
pairs, we could limit such identifications to space-time points. A space-time 
point would be a pair <b,a>, where a is a pointlike part of a branch9, and b is a 
complete branch. Call this proposal Space-time Point Pairing.  
 
 Once we adopt Space-time Point Pairing, familiar macroscopic ontology 
can be recovered from the picture in a number of ways. My preference is for a 
supersubstantivalist view which identifies material objects and events directly 
with spatio-temporal region, and then identifies spatio-temporal regions with 
fusions of space-time points. Fusions of ordered pairs might seem rather strange 
entities – but all that we need say about them for present purposes is that the 
principles of classical mereology apply to them unrestrictedly. For ease of 
exposition, I will restrict myself to discussing this version of the view, though 
Space-time Point Pairing is in principle compatible with other accounts of the 
relation between space-time, material objects, and events, for example with 
various accounts which posit some kind of fundamental occupation relation. 
 
 The combination of Space-time Point Pairing with the SW semantics 
avoids the problems with mereology which dogged the previous proposal. The 
mereology of space-time regions and of macroscopic objects and events works 
exactly as it ordinarily does: the parthood relation which relates my foot to me 
and the battle to the war is characterized by the usual principles of classical 
mereology. The Branch Binding Criterion is satisfied; objects and events are 
identical to fusions of space-time points, and each of the space-time points which 
is a part of such a fusion is branch-bound in virtue of including a branch as an 
element. Hence macroscopic objects and events (and all of their extended parts) 
are indirectly bound to particular branches, in virtue of all of their pointlike 
                                            
9 What does it mean to say that a is a pointlike part of a branch? Writers on 
Everettian QM, such as Saunders and Wallace [2008] and Tappenden [2008], freely 
make use of the ’temporal part’ terminology, and apply it to parts of branches. As 
already noted, this is an idealization; the current proposal merely extends this 
idealization to pointlike parts. 
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parts being directly bound to particular branches. And as with Macroscopic 
Pairing, there is no need for the troublesome assumption that complete 
continuants (rather than stages) are the primary bearers of mental states. 
 
 Have the problems with the mereology of macroscopic objects and events 
on the Macroscopic Pairing proposal merely been shifted to problems with the 
mereology of the space-time points themselves? In a sense, yes; but in the 
context of space-time points the conflict with ordinary usage is far less of a 
problem. If we take it that pairs are mereological simples, then space-time points 
will have no parts, just as is usually supposed: this is my preferred option. If we 
take it (following Lewis) that pairs are sets, and that sets have their subsets as 
parts, then each space-time point has as parts the singleton set containing an 
entire branch, and the singleton set containing a pointlike part of that branch. 
This is perhaps a little counterintuitive, but is not in serious tension with 
ordinary usage; our ordinary thought and talk about parthood does not 
adjudicate clearly either way on the question of whether space-time points have 
(non-spatio-temporal) parts, whereas it does adjudicate clearly on the question of 
whether macroscopic objects and events have macroscopic parts. 
 
 If we grant the plausible assumption that the properties of macroscopic 
objects and events supervene on the properties of their pointlike parts (without 
limiting the supervenience base to local or to intrinsic properties of pointlike 
parts), Space-time Point Pairing also removes the need for modification of the 
metaphysics of macroscopic properties. Pointlike parts of macroscopic objects 
and events will still have dogleg properties, which are had in virtue of properties 
had by their second elements; however, ascribing properties to macroscopic 
objects and events themselves will not need an underlying layer of macroscopic 
dogleg properties. Property-ascription for macroscopic objects works in the 
Space-time Point Pairing picture just as it does in a standard one-world theory. 
We need only be revisionary about the metaphysics of space-time points: we can 
be as conservative as we like about the metaphysics of macroscopic objects and 
events which are constructed out of or located at sets of those points. 
 
 An interesting consequence of this proposal is that the ‘space-time’ of the 
quantum mechanics and quantum field theory formalism, in terms of which 
branches are defined, is not the same as the ‘space-times’ of macroscopic worlds. 
The former ‘space-time’ is a single entity common to multiple branches, while 
each of the latter ‘space-times’ is tied to a particular macroscopic course of 
events. It seems likely that charity arguments in the style of Wallace [2005] will 
tend to lead us to interpret our ordinary term ‘space-time’ as referring to the 
latter kind. And this conception of space-times as linked to branches could have 
independent motivation; having a distinct space-time for each branch would help 
to make conceptual room for the matter-distribution-dependence of the metrical 
structure of space-time which appears to be needed for quantum gravity. So I’d 
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suggest that the Space-time Point Pairer should reserve the term ‘space-time’ for 
the emergent entity linked to individual branches, and something like ‘pre-space-
time’ for the fundamental entity common to branches.  
 
 Unlike Macroscopic Pairing, Space-time Point Pairing does not require a 
modified mereology for macroscopic objects and events, but can incorporate 
familiar systems of mereology unchanged. Nor does it require a network of 
macroscopic dogleg properties underlying all ordinary attributions of properties 
to macroscopic objects and events. It therefore spares us two fragments of rather 
arcane and unlovely metaphysics. And in common with Macroscopic Pairing, it 
has the advantage over Literal Fission that it can give a non-revisionary account 
of our ignorance of post-death future contingents, and hence can provide for a 
fully general account of objective probability. 
5. Objections to the pairing proposals 
 In this section I will discuss some objections which arise for both the 
Macroscopic Pairing and Space-time Point Pairing proposals. But first I wish to 
record my suspicion that the most common response to the proposals will be 
that they are simply absurd, no matter whether or not they recover what we 
take to be the correct truth-values for our utterances. This sort of response was 
referred to by Lewis [1986, section 2.8] as ‘the incredulous stare’; like Lewis, I 
will not attempt to refute it.  
1.1.1 Objection 1 – Phenomenology 
 It might be objected that we don’t feel like pairs, or like fusions of pairs; 
that our actual phenomenology could not be available for a pair. Similarly, we 
might worry that we have a priori knowledge (or certainty) that we ourselves 
exist, but not that pairs exist or that fusions of pairs exist. 
 
 A quick response to this sort of objection goes as follows: how would you 
know what it would feel like to be a pair or a fusion of pairs? Without knowing 
that, how could you know that it would match our actual phenomenology? 
Perhaps, then, our actual phenomenology reflects just how it in fact feels to be a 
branch-continuant; a defender of the pairing proposals could likewise say that 
our knowledge/certainty that we ourselves exist just is the knowledge/certainty 
that certain pairs exist, since that’s what we’ve turned out to be. 
 
 The burden of proof here is with the objector. What is needed to make 
the objection from phenomenology stick is an argument that it couldn’t feel like 
anything at all to be a branch-continuant or a fusion of point pairs, or at least 
that it couldn’t feel anything remotely like this; and absent a positive argument 
of this sort, the identification of macroscopic objects and events with branch-
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continuants or with fusions of point pairs appears legitimate. Compare the 
situation with materialism in the philosophy of mind; if materialism is right, 
human beings are just identical with their bodies, and bodies are lumps of meat. 
The complaint ‘I don’t feel like a lump of meat’ isn’t likely to cut much ice in the 
materialism debate; what is wanted is a convincing argument that it couldn’t feel 
like anything to be a lump of meat. Similarly, we need to distinguish the worry 
that it seems surprising or counterintuitive that we are pairs or fusions of pairs 
from the worry that we know what it would be like to be a pair, or a fusion of 
pairs, and that that we know our experience is not of this sort. 
1.1.2 Objection 2 – Branch-continuants are unnatural 
 Another possible line of objection is that branch-continuants are in some 
sense gerrymandered, and hence unnatural candidates for the referents of our 
terms. In the Lewisian picture, naturalness is fundamentally a property of 
properties; so the objection put in this setting is that being a branch-continuant 
is less natural than being a continuant. Therefore, so the objection goes, we 
should reject a semantics according to which branch-continuants are taken to be 
the referents of our ordinary object-terms and event-terms. 
 
 The response that a friend of Macroscopic Pairing should make to this 
objection is that candidacy for reference is determined through a charity-style 
procedure, in which naturalness is only one factor. Naturalness must be balanced 
by the need to interpret as much as possible of our discourse in such a way that 
it comes out true (or as knowledge, if we prefer the knowledge-maximizing 
principle of charity defended by Williamson [2007]). The arguments of section 2 
were intended to establish that Literal Fission falsified too much of our common-
sense thought about the future to meet any reasonable requirement of charity; 
and it seems plausible that the lower degree of naturalness of the property being 
a branch-continuant compared to being a continuant is not enough to 
counterbalance this uncharitability. 
 
 In sum, if Everettian QM is correct, then there are no better candidates 
as the referents of our ordinary terms for material objects and events than 
branch-continuants or fusions of point pairs; other candidates would falsify too 
much of what we take to be true (or to be known). 
1.1.3 Objection 3 – Pairs are abstract; we are concrete 
 According to the Macroscopic Pairing proposal, the concrete objects are 
a species of the abstract objects: the abstract pair ¡my branch, aggregate of my 
branch segments¿ is identified with a concrete object, viz., me. It follows that 
some abstracta are concreta, and that, for example, some abstracta are causally 
active and have spatio-temporal location. And the Space-time Point Pairing 
proposal as I have developed it has it that concreta are fusions of abstracta. 
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These views accordingly involve some revisionism about the abstract-concrete 
distinction. But is this a fatal difficulty? Our grasp of the abstract-concrete 
distinction is nothing like as clear as we would like it to be. There are already 
various well-known borderline cases: examples might include the global economy, 
facts, or heat. This seems like a case in which our metaphysical intuitions might 
be negotiable, if giving them up results in gains elsewhere. 
 
 The objection from the abstract/concrete distinction is particularly 
unconvincing when applied to Space-time Point Pairing10. Space-time points are 
well-known to be a case where the abstract/concrete distinction is at its most 
problematic; our judgements about abstractness and concreteness are on 
particularly weak ground when it comes to points (hence the debate about 
whether Hartry Field’s [1980] nominalism really deserves the name). If any 
entities are good candidates for occupying a middle-ground between abstractness 
and concreteness, space-time points are.  
 
 Indeed, there is a familiar precedent for the identification of objects and 
events with fusions of abstracta; Quine [1965] proposed a sparse fundamental 
ontology which reduced objects and events to space-time regions, which reduced 
space-time regions to sets of space-time points, and which reduced space-time 
points to ordered quadruples of real numbers. The present proposals are less 
radical than that: the pairs in question have as elements parts of branches of the 
quantum state, entities which have by many past Everettians been identified 
directly with macroscopic objects and events. In contrast, Quine’s proposal 
reduces objects to fusions of sets of quadruples of numbers; nothing at all 
recognisably ‘concrete’ enters in at the metaphysical ground floor. 
 
 It should also be borne in mind that adopting Space-time Point Pairing 
does not commit us to the supersubstantivalist move discussed in section 4. If we 
choose not to make this move, then we don’t even have to identify material 
objects and events with fusions of abstracta. All we have to say is that material 
objects and events are located at fusions of abstracta, which may be less 
controversial still. 
1.1.4 Objection 4 – Pairs are arbitrary 
 Mathematical logic gives us more than one way of defining an ordered 
pair11. Which of these entities are you and I identical to? The objection runs 
                                            
10 This fact might provide a further reason for preferring Space-time Point Pairing 
to Macroscopic Pairing, over and above the arguments of section 4. 
11 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ordered˙pair currently lists nine, eight of which are 
set-theoretic. 
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exactly parallel to Benacerraf’s well-known objection to the combination of 
Platonism with set-theoretic constructions of numbers12. 
 
 It should be noted that the pairs appealed to by the pairing proposals 
don’t need to be ordered pairs. One element of any branch-continuant pair will 
always be a (perhaps improper) part of the other. So we have the option of 
replacing ordered pairs with non-ordered pairs, and replacing talk of the first 
element or the second element with talk of the smaller element and the larger 
element. In the case of worlds, where the two elements are the same size, it 
makes no difference which element we take to be the continuant and which we 
take to be the branch. 
 
 If we follow this route, we avoid the problem of choosing one definition 
of an ordered pair over another. It also has the advantage that we don’t need to 
make an arbitrary choice about whether our ordered pairs are <continuant, 
branch> pairs or <branch, continuant> pairs. Just the unordered set with the two 
elements will do. But even if there is some simplest natural candidate (such as 
the unordered set of the two objects, perhaps) this wouldn’t make the problem 
go away altogether. There would still be many distinct set-theoretic 
constructions with all the structure we require. And it’s difficult to see what sort 
of evidence could rule out the claim that we are, for example, Kuratowski 
ordered pairs instead of unordered sets. 
 
 To this concern, we can respond as many have wanted to respond to 
Benacerraf’s problem, and say that there is no fact of the matter about which of 
the various set-theoretic constructions are really identical to macroscopic objects 
and events. This indeterminacy can then be cashed out in terms of your 
favourite bivalence-preserving theory of vagueness13; appealing options might 
include epistemicism (Williamson [1994]), contextualism (Fara [2000]), semantic 
indeterminacy (in the sense of Dorr [2003]), and primitive metaphysical 
indeterminacy (Barnes and Williams [2010]). Indeterminacy of this general sort 
in the reference of our terms is in fact already fairly widely accepted; it has often 
been embraced in order to solve the Problem of the Many. 
                                            
12 See Benacerraf [1965]. 
13 Supervaluationists characteristically distinguish between preserving the Law of 
Excluded Middle and preserving bivalence, and choose to preserve the former but 
not the latter. Since the SW semantic proposal is in part motivated by the desire to 
preserve bivalence, the appropriate theory of indeterminacy for our purposes ought 
to be bivalence-preserving. 
18 
 
6. Overview of the pairing proposals 
 At this stage it is worth clarifying the structure of the ontology behind 
the Space-time Point Pairing and Macroscopic Pairing versions of EQM. The 
pictures are complicated, and it is easy to lose track of the commitments that 
they really involve. 
 
 At the fundamental level, the ontology is monistic - there is just one 
single highly-structured object, the universal quantum state. Call the language 
which describes reality in these terms the Universal State language. By use of 
decoherence theory to pick out privileged structure from the universal state, we 
can construct a language (call it the Pluriverse language) in which we quantify 
over structural features of the universal state: branches, branch segments, and so 
on. 
 
 The Pluriverse language can be thought of as the working language of 
metaphysical theorizing for Everettians. It is flexible enough to enable us to refer 
to everything we want to speak about, whether inside or outside the metaphysics 
room. But it is not a charitable account of our ordinary thought and talk about 
the macroscopic world, as the problems with Literal Fission show. We therefore 
need a third language - call it the Universe language – in order to account for 
our uncertainty of future contingents. The pairing proposals comprise alternative 
accounts of the relationship between the Pluriverse language and the Universe 
language14. Both involve the idea that our Universe language quantifiers are 
generally restricted to range over a very special kind of entities – ordered pairs, 
or fusions of ordered pairs. 
 
 According to the point pairing proposals, no macroscopic world overlaps 
any other macroscopic world. What is left of the intuitive thought that EQM is 
a branching theory? Both Space-time Point Pairing and Macroscopic Pairing 
involve no branching at the level of the Universe language; however, they do still 
incorporate branching at an underlying level, the level of the Pluriverse 
Language. The structure produced by decoherence, which provides the ‘raw 
material’ for the elements of the pairs identified with space-time points, is taken 
to be a branching structure; different branches genuinely do have parts in 
common. 
 
 The pairing proposals essentially specify procedures for constructing 
non-overlapping worlds out of a set of overlapping branches, which raises the 
question of whether the branching structure might be in principle dispensable. 
An alternative approach to EQM would interpret consistent histories directly as 
                                            
14 The terms ‘Pluriverse Language’ and ‘Universe Language’ are intended to recall 
the two languages employed by Lewis [1968] to help make sense of modal operators 
in ordinary language. 
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representing non-overlapping worlds. No branching structure then need enter 
into the picture at any stage, and the SW semantics could be applied without 
appeal to Macroscopic Pairing or Space-time Point Pairing. I suspect that this 
may in the end be the most natural way to understand EQM, and I will discuss 
it in more detail in the next section. But the discussion so far has aimed only to 
clarify various metaphysical pictures which do take it that decoherence provides 
us with a branching structure: Literal Fission, Macroscopic Pairing, and Space-
time Point Pairing. All three of these views give us the resources to explain 
probability and uncertainty about events in our own future, while preserving a 
bivalent semantics. Like Macroscopic Pairing, Space-time Point Pairing does 
better than Literal Fission by making sense of post-death uncertainty. Unlike 
Macroscopic Pairing, Space-time Point Pairing does not achieve this at the cost 
of an implausible mereology and property structure, and it deals better with the 
objection from the abstract/concrete distinction. I therefore recommend Space-
time Point Pairing to those Everettians who think that decoherence gives us a 
structure of overlapping branches.  
7. Everettian Quantum Mechanics without branching 
 Macroscopic Pairing and Space-time Point Pairing both involve 
branching at the level of the Pluriverse language, while involving no branching 
at the level of the Universe language. In the previous section I argued that 
Space-time Point Pairing is the best way of constructing non-overlapping 
macroscopic worlds, objects and events from the materials provided by a 
structure of overlapping branches. But this construction itself gives some cause 
for concern. The distinction between branches and worlds is an unwelcome one, 
since these terms have often been used interchangeably; and the pairing 
proposals commit us to a number of odd-sounding claims which, while perhaps 
not directly contradicting our everyday beliefs, certainly do not appear among 
them. For example, both views commit us to the claim that space-time points 
have entire branches as elements. In the light of this, there is some motivation to 
consider an alternative framework, which dispenses altogether with overlapping 
branches and removes the need to identify concrete objects and events with 
ordered pairs. In this final section, I will consider such an approach to EQM, 
which interprets consistent histories as diverging worlds, in the sense of Lewis 
[1986, p.206]. Diverging worlds are exactly alike up to the time of divergence, 
but - unlike branching worlds - they have no parts in common.  
 
 Nothing in the formalism of quantum mechanics compels us to think of 
consistent histories as branching rather than diverging. In the consistent 
histories formalism, a branch is a consistent history; a string of quantum-
mechanical projection operators obeying certain decoherence conditions. The 
point at issue between the diverging and branching conceptions is whether the 
entities represented by some particular projection operator appearing in two 
different consistent histories are numerically identical, or whether they are 
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(numerically distinct) qualitative duplicates. Numerically identical entities give 
us branching worlds; qualitative duplicates give us diverging worlds.  
 
 A diverging interpretation of the consistent histories formalism has a 
great deal in common with Lewisian modal realism15 (with the exception, of 
course, that the laws of quantum mechanics hold in every Everettian world). 
Both views posit a set of complete histories, many of which have initial segments 
which are qualitatively identical with one another, but none of which have any 
parts in common; both views locate each history in a distinct space-time; and 
both views interpret much of our ordinary uncertainty of contingent fact as self-
locating uncertainty within the set of histories. 
 
 Although Saunders and Wallace [2008] tacitly assumed an underlying 
branching structure, Saunders no longer considers this to be warranted by the 
quantum formalism; Saunders [2010] argues that from a mathematical 
standpoint one can well defend the picture of Everettian histories as diverging, 
consistent with the Saunders-Wallace semantics. I agree with him that the 
mathematical structure of quantum mechanics does not itself decide between 
branching and divergence. Nor, as far as I can see, does any element of 
physicists’ own practice in talking about worlds in the Everett interpretation. 
The question of whether the entities represented by the projection operators 
concerned are numerically identical or just qualitatively identical has a 
distinctively metaphysical flavour; so we might do well to look to metaphysics 
when answering it. 
 
 Lewis [1986, p.207-8] famously argued that a branching version of modal 
realism presents problems for making sense of our thought and talk about the 
future. If there are multiple futures branching from this very moment, then it 
seems that an expression like ‘the future’ must suffer from reference failure; the 
definite description presupposes uniqueness, but this presupposition is false. It 
should be clear that Lewis’ considerations apply to EQM in exactly the same 
way as they apply to modal realism; the argument against Literal Fission in 
section 2 is a close relative of the Lewisian argument against a branching version 
of modal realism. It is therefore surprising that while this argument has been 
highly influential in the metaphysics of alethic modality, it has until recently had 
little impact on the interpretation of EQM.  
 
 A diverging interpretation of the consistent histories formalism permits a 
straightforward bivalent semantics, without involving us in the rather arcane 
metaphysics of Macroscopic Point Pairing or Space-time Point Pairing. I 
                                            
15 Lewis [1986]. 
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conclude that Everettians would do well to abandon the problematic metaphor 
of branching in favour of the more germane metaphor of parallel worlds16. 
                                            
16 Thanks to Frank Arntzenius, Andrew Bacon, Cian Dorr, Hilary Greaves, Eleanor 
Knox, Chris Timpson, David Wallace, Robert Williams, the audience at an Oxford 
discussion group, and a referee for PQ; and, especially, to John Hawthorne and 
Simon Saunders. This paper was written during a period of research supported by 
the UK Arts and Humanities Research Council. 
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